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CHAPTER 22 
Evidence 
FREDERICK A. MC DERMOTT 
§22.1. Judicial notice: Federal regulation. In Gilbert v. Merrimac 
Development Corp.,l the defendant, while before the Supreme Judicial 
Court, for the first time in the proceeding, cited a federal Executive 
Order.2 The Court reaffirmed its earlier position, taken in Mast.rullo 
v. Ryan,S that it was not bound to take judicial notice of the Executive 
Order, which had not been brought to the attention of either court 
below. The Executive Order was material to the merits of the case, 
an action involving a federal government contract. 
Shortly after that decision, in the case of Ralston v. Commissioner 
of Agriculture4 the Court upheld a state regulation of transportation 
and garbage feeding of swine5 as reasonable and valid in a proceeding 
for an injunction against its enforcement. The case had been reported 
from the Superior Court without decision. 
The purpose of the regulation was to stamp out the disease known 
as vesicular exanthema. The brief filed in the Supreme Judicial Court 
by the defendants made reference to certain federal regulations pre-
viously promulgated for the control of the same disease. These fed-
eral regulations were not referred to in the record and apparently were 
not brought to the attention of the court below. The Court again 
cited Mastrullo v. Ryan for the proposition that under such circum-
stances it was not required to notice a federal regulation. Neverthe-
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§22.l. 1333 Mass. 758, 133 N.E.2d 491 (1956). 
2 Exec. Order No. 9001, effective Dec. 27, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787, amended by 
Exec. Order No. 9296, 8 Fed. Reg. 1429,50 U.S.C.A., App. §611n. 
:I 328 Mass. 621, 105 N.E.2d 469 (1952). See also Glover v. Mitchell, 319 Mass.!, 
64 N.E.2d 648 (1946). The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet had 
occasion to construe the Federal Register Act provision that "the contents of the 
Federal Register shall be judicially noticed." Act of July 26. 1935. c. 417, §7. 49 
Stat. 500, 502, 44 U.S.C. §307 (1952). 
41956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 475, 133 N.E.2d 589. 
1\ Order No. 52 promulgated by the Commissioner of Agriculture and the Direc-
tor of Livestock Disease Control for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, approved 
in Council Jan. 27,1956. G.L., c. 129, §2. 
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less the Court held that this was an appropriate case in which to judi-
cially notice the federal regulations, and did so. 
In justification of this action, the Court pointed out that the case 
had been reported without decision and that the plaintiffs were not 
prejudiced thereby, since it would not appear that they could have 
adduced evidence bearing thereon even if the regulations had been 
cited below. The Court further cited the Federal Register Act and 
cases from other jurisdictions as well as Massachusetts for the proposi-
tion that federal regulations are a proper subject for judicial notice 
by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
On the surface, the Gilbert and Ralston cases may appear to be quite 
similar, with the Court in the first case refusing, and in the second case 
electing, in its discretion, to judicially notice federal regulations which 
had not been put into the record below. 
It is true that the Gilbert case falls within the rule of Mast,rullo v. 
Ryan, which makes judicial notice discretionary with the Supreme 
Judicial Court under such circumstances. However, the Ralston case 
should be clearly distinguished. The distinction goes far deeper than 
the discretion of the Supreme Judicial Court, exercised in the Ralston 
case and not in the Gilbert case. It should be noted that in the Ralston 
case the federal regulations were not involved as law as such, to be 
applied to the merits of a set of facts as determinative of the rights 
of litigants. Their relevance to the controversy was in their existence 
viewed as a matter of fact only. A question of "constitutional fact" 
was involved. The fact that the federal authorities had earlier taken 
action by regulation to stamp out the same disease which was the 
object of the domestic regulation in question bore upon the reason-
ableness of the domestic regulation. The existence of the federal 
regulation was a fact possibly present to the mind of the promulgators 
of the regulation in question, which would tend to make their action 
under their statutory authority not unreasonable, arbitrary, and ca-
pricious. That the Court in substance so held may be seen from its 
language: 
We notice the regulations not for proof of the facts alleged 
therein in respect to vesicular exanthema, but for proof of the 
fact that a Federal officer charged with responsibility in the field 
has said what he has said about the disease and has stated that 
certain controls are required and has imposed regulations accord-
ingly .... 6 
... What Federal authorities within their statutory orbit had 
said and done were relevant on the question of the reasonable 
need for the action taken.7 
A similar situation was presented in Supreme Malt Products Co. v. 
Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission,s where the Court noted cases 
61956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 475, 477, 133 N.E.2d 589, 591. 
71956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 480, 133 N.E.2d at 593. 
81956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 483, 133 N.E.2d 775. 
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upholding regulations governing or prohibiting the liquor traffic.9 
Judicial notice, within the bounds of reason, of any such relevant 
facts would appear to be not merely a matter of discretion but a 
mandatory part of the function of the Court in passing on a question 
of constitutionality. As the Court said in its opinion, "all reasonable 
presumptions are to be made in favor of such a regulation." 10 
The classic statement on the subject is found in the dissenting 
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis (in which Mr. Justice Holmes con-
curred), in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan: 
With the wisdom of the legislation we have, of course, no con-
cern. But, under the due process clause as construed, we must 
determine whether the prohibition of excess weights can reasonably 
be deemed necessary; whether the prohibition can reasonably be 
deemed an appropriate means of preventing short weights and 
incidental unfair practices; and whether compliance with the limi-
tation prescribed can reasonably be deemed practicable. The 
determination of these questions involves an enquiry into facts. 
Unless we know the facts on which the legislators may have acted, 
we cannot properly decide whether they were (or whether their 
measures are) unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Knowledge 
is essential to understanding; and understanding should precede 
judging. Sometimes, if we would guide by the light of reason, 
we must let our minds be bold. But, in this case, we have merely 
to acquaint ourselves with the art of breadmaking and the usages 
of the trade; with the devices by which buyers of bread are im-
posed upon and honest bakers or dealers are subjected by their 
dishonest fellows to unfair competition; with the problems which 
have confronted public officials charged with the enforcement of 
the laws prohibiting short weights, and with their experience in 
administering those laws ... 11 
Much evidence referred to by me is not in the record. Nor could 
it have been included. It is the history of the experience gained 
under similar legislation, and the result of scientific experiments 
made, since the entry of the judgment below. Of such events in 
our history, whether occurring before or after the enactment of 
the statute or of the entry of the judgment, the Court should 
acquire knowledge, and must, in my opinion, take judicial notice, 
whenever required to perform the delicate judicial task here in-
volved.12 
While it is perhaps true that few courts would willingly state their 
duty in this respect in such enthusiastic and unqualified terms as did 
Mr. Justice Brandeis, it would seem, as was said above, that judicial 
notice, within the bounds of reason, of the facts bearing on constitu-
91956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 485, 133 N.E.2d at 777. 
10 Ibid. 
11264 U.S. 504, 519, 44 Sup. Ct. 412, 416, 68 L. Ed. 813, 829 (1924). 
12 264 U.S. at 533, 44 Sup. Ct. at 420, 68 L. Ed. at 835. 
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tionality is an obligatory and not a discretionary function of the courts. 
The proceeding is not merely an ad hoc adversary conflict, and its out-
come should not be left to depend entirely on the fortuitous circum-
stances of either the diligence of counselor the whim of the court. 
§22.2. Opening: Reference by district attorney to alleged con-
fession. In Commonwealth v. Makarewicz,! a trial for murder, counsel 
for the defendant at the outset moved that the court instruct the 
district attorney to make no reference in his opening statement to the 
jury relative to the word "confession" or any statements obtained 
from the defendant which might be construed as a confession. The 
court denied the motion, to which defendant excepted. Apparently 
the opening for the Commonwealth included at least a statement to 
the effect that the prosecution would introduce in evidence a confes-
sion by the defendant. The court later found, on a preliminary hear-
ing, that the alleged confession had been made voluntarily, and ad-
mitted it in evidence. 
The defendant's assignment of error in the denial of his motion to 
restrict the Commonwealth's opening could well have been summarily 
disposed of on the simple ground that in the light of the later ad-
mission of the confession, no prejudice to the defendant was shown. 
Such an opinion could have been written without decision as to the 
correctness of the ruling when made. 
However, the Supreme Judicial Court did not seize upon this ex-
pedient, but approved the ruling, with a quotation of language from 
Commonwealth v. Clark, to the effect that "As a general rule, counsel 
is free to state in his opening anything that he expects to be able to 
prove by evidence .... In the present case no reason why the con-
fession would not be admissible was stated by counsel for the defend-
ant. There was no error in refusing to restrict the opening." 2 
Conceding the accuracy of the quoted statement as to the general 
rule, the specific authority cited, Commonwealth v. Clark, does not 
appear to be in point. As the quoted language indicates, it surprisingly 
appears that the defense in the Clark case did not take the position 
that the confession would be objected to as involuntary. The defense 
was based wholly upon a claim of insanity. The case is therefore 
hardly analogous to the Makarewicz situation, in which the admission 
of the confession was opposed as coerced on facts which required 
several pages of the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion to resolve in 
favor of admission. 
It is true, of course, that decisions as to admissibility of evidence 
are not commonly made on an opening, and it will often turn out that 
evidence referred to in an opening will later, when offered, be held 
to be inadmissible. The trial could not possibly be held to await 
minute analysis of the admissibility of all such questions with respect 
to all such references in the opening. However, it has been held that 
§22.2. 1333 Mass. 575, 132 N.E.2d 294 (1956); see also §12.1, supra, for further 
discussion. 
2292 Mass. 409, 410, 198 N.E. 641, 643 (1935). 
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a reference to evidence which is clearly inadmissible is objectionable 
even in a civil case.8 
Evidence that a defendant in a criminal case has confessed his guilt 
is felt in Massachusetts to have such an inherently prejudicial effect 
upon the minds of the jurors that where objection is made to its 
admission on the ground that the alleged confession was involuntarily 
made, the fact of its voluntariness must first be found by the judge 
before the jury is permitted to hear the evidence.4 The procedure 
itself is commonly referred to as the "humane" practice of the Massa-
chusetts courts,1i and is being adopted by other jurisdictions as well.6 
It would appear to be in line with this policy to restrict the opening 
as requested in Makarewicz where the defense manifests an intent to 
contest the voluntariness of the confession. In a case where the con-
fession is later found by the court to have been involuntarily made 
and it is excluded, it is questionable whether any amount of adjuration 
by the judge that the jury ignore the statements about the confession 
will adequately protect the defendant from prejudice - except in the 
rarefied atmosphere of jurisprudential theory. 
The high potential of prejudice to the defendant in the analagous 
situation of the admission of a dying declaration has led the Massa-
chusetts courts to a practice similar to that in the admission of a 
confession. When the question whether the declarant actually knew 
that his death was imminent is raised, it must also be resolved by a 
finding by the judge on evidence taken in the absence of the jury, 
preliminary to admitting evidence of the declaration.7 It would appear 
that a similar prohibition of reference by the district attorney in his 
opening to a dying declaration whose admissibility is to be contested 
would be desirable. 
While on the subject of the "humane" practice, it is interesting 
to note that the Court in 1925 approved the action of a trial judge 
who informed the jury that he had found as a fact, on evidence taken 
in the jury's absence, that the declarant knew he was dying.s The 
8 Posell v. Herscovitz, 237 Mass. 513, 514, 130 N.E. 69, 70 (1921). 
4 Commonwealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185, 188 (1876); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 
!lI!I Mass. 590, 604, 48 N.E.2d 630, 639 (1943). 
Ii "When there is conflicting testimony, the humane practice in this Common-
wealth is for the judge, if he decides that it is admissible, to instruct the jury that 
they may consider all the evidence, and that they should exclude the confession, if, 
upon the whole evidence in the case, they are satisfied that it was not the voluntary 
act of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277, 5 N.E. 494, 
495 (1885). See also Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 498, 193 N.E. 68, 70 
(1934). 
6 See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 75 Sup. Ct. 908, 100 L. Ed. 1505 (1953), fol-
lowing New York law; People v. Burwell, 44 Cal. 2d 16, 279 P.2d 744 (1955); State 
v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15 N.W.2d 585 (1944); State v. Bellew, 282 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. 
1955); People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927); State v. Boone, 228 S.C. 
438, 90 S.E.2d 640 (1955). 
7 Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 193 N.E. 68 (1934); Commonwealth v. 
Brewer, 164 Mass. 577, 42 N.E. 92 (1895). 
8 Commonwealth v. Cantor, 253 Mass. 509, 512, 149 N.E. 205, 206 (1925). The 
opinion cites in support of the ruling a number of cases of which only one, Com-
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prejudicial effect on the jury of such a statement, It IS true, will be 
somewhat lessened by an instruction that the question is for the jury 
to consider anew, but it is far from reasonable to assume that the 
damage is completely neutralized. Here again it would appear that 
the better course would be to disapprove the practice. 
While it is realized that it is in general necessary to the existence 
of the jury system to assume that the jury follows the instructions of 
the court to the letter, the situations indicated above, it is believed, 
should cause a certain amount of uneasiness - particularly when a 
life is at stake - which can hardly be dismissed as mere squeamish-
ness. 
§22.3. Hearsay: Past recollection recorded. Prior to the 1956 de-
cision of Fisher v. Swartz,! the law of Massachusetts had appeared to 
be well settled to the effect that while the past recollection recorded 
exception to the hearsay rule was recognized so as to admit the read-
ing of the memorandum in the course of the testimony of the witness 
and the memorandum might even be shown to the jury, the memo-
randum itself was not admissible in evidence. 
In the case of Bendett v. Bendett,2 decided in 1943, the Court had 
reviewed the decisions, and taken the position that admission of the 
memorandum itself was error. In this holding, the Court followed 
the minority view,3 giving the following reason for the holding: 
... such a writing under some circumstances might have some 
inherent evidential weight independently of its adoption by the 
witness as the expression and embodiment of his testimony. In 
such a case, neither party would be entitled to have that weight 
thrown into the scale, on the merits of the case, unless the writing 
should be admissible on some other ground.4 
This language expressed the feeling that permitting the paper itself 
to go to the jury room with the other exhibits would result in giving 
to the testimony of a witness whose memory was not refreshed a form 
whose tangibility and persistence before the jury in its deliberations 
created an unfair advantage over the testimony of the ordinary wit-
ness who testified of his own recollection, orally, and whose testimony 
therefore lived only in the memory of the jury.5 
It came as a surprise therefore when the Court in Fisher v. Swartz 
reversed this holding. The Court pointed out that in most, if not all, 
situations where a memorandum of past recollection is put in evidence, 
monwealth v. Rogers, 181 Mass. 184, 63 N.E. 421 (1902), can be considered to be 
nearly in point. 
§22.3. 1333 Mass. 265, 130 N.E.2d 575 (1955). 
2315 Mass. 59, 52 N.E.2d 2 (1943). 
3 Cf. the citation of authority in Fisher v. Swartz, 333 Mass. 265, 269, 130 N.E.2d 
575, 578 (1955). 
4315 Mass. at 65, 52 N.E.2d at 6. 
II Ibid. 
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the error would be harmless, as the majority indeed held it was in the 
Bendett case: 
Prior to its admission the witness would usually have read to the 
court or jury the contents of the memorandum, and its admission 
as evidence, since it would have added little or nothing, would 
generally be regarded as harmless error. We prefer a less squeam-
ish approach to the question. Rather than to say admission of the 
writing is error, but error that does no harm, we think that it is 
better to say that there is no error at all.6 
The Court held that the principal case was one in which there was 
no error. In other words, the case at bar fell within the situation de-
scribed, where the Court held that because there was no harm to the 
opponent, there was no error. 
The Court expressly cautions that its decision should not be mis-
construed as swinging to the opposite extreme and holding that it is 
always error to exclude such a memorandum. It is conceivable that 
there might be situations where the introduction in evidence of the 
memorandum might be prejudicial, in which case it should be ex-
cluded. The decision actually follows the stand of Wigmore7 and 
makes the admission or exclusion of the memorandum depend upon 
the sound discretion of the trial judge as to whether its admission 
would be prejudicial. 
The approach and decision in the Fisher case, would appear, on a 
parity of reasoning, to lead to a holding that in the ordinary situa-
tion there is no error in the exclusion of a memorandum or record, 
even though it is entitled to admission, where a witness has previously 
testified to the same effect, or has been permitted to read the contents 
of the paper in the course of his testimony. However, in Common-
wealth v. Chapin,s decided a few months later, a witness had read 
certain public school records concerning a psychometric examination 
of the defendant into the record in full. The Court assumed, with-
out deciding, that the records themselves should have been admitted, 
but held that there was no prejudice to the defendant in the trial 
court's exclusion of the documents, citing as dictum Fisher v. Swartz. 
It seems that the cases can hardly be distinguished and that here also 
the ruling excluding the document might well have been held to be 
discretionary, and not, as it was held, error, though harmless. 
§22.4. Hearsay: Admissibility of memorandum, necessity of pro-
duction of original. Two cases decided during the 1956 SURVEY year, 
Fisher v. Swartz1 and Saba v. Cohen,2 neatly illustrated the simple but 
vital distinctions in admissibility and the requirement of production 
of an original in the differing cases of use of a memorandum: 
6333 Mass. at 269, 130 N.E.2d at 578. 
T See 3 Wigmore on Evidence §755 (3d ed. 1940). 
S 333 Mass. 610, 132 N.E.2d 404 (1956). 
§22.4. 1333 Mass. 265, 130 N.E.2d 575 (1955), discussed in §22.3 supra. 
2333 Mass. 557, 132 N.E.2d 182 (1956). 
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(1) To refresh the recollection of the witness, 
(2) Under the common law exception to the hearsay rule as past 
recollection recorded, and 
(3) As a business record under the statute G.L., c. 233, §78.3 
Where a witness refers to a memorandum whether made by the 
witness himself or not, and whether an "original" or not, as a result 
of which his memory as to the events in question is presently revived, 
his testimony is the only admissible evidence. The memorandum itself, 
under the general principles of trial practice requiring oral question 
and answer as the normal method of eliciting sworn testimony of 
witnesses, is inadmissible as an accompaniment to or part of or as a 
substitute for the "live" testimony of the witness.4 If it is to be 
admitted, it must be on some other ground independently of its use 
as a successful stimulant to the memory of the witness. In this con-
nection, therefore, the question of the requirement of production of 
the original does not arise. 
Where the witness himself had made the memorandum of his own 
knowledge at or near the time of the event recorded, and, though 
he remembers the making of the memorandum, and vouches for its 
accuracy, is unable to recall the facts stated therein, it qualifies for 
use as a memorandum of past recollection recorded. It may, under 
this exception to the hearsay rule, be read as a part of his testimony 
by the witness, and may be shown to the jury,5 and in the discretion 
of the trial judge may itself be admitted in evidence, as was held in 
Fisher v. Swartz, discussed in Section 22.3 above. The same case also 
restated the general rule that the original of the memorandum is 
necessary, if procurable, in a case of past recollection recorded.s 
A memorandum is qualified under the statute as a business record 
3 Acts of 1954. c. 442. 
4 Bendett v. Bendett. 315 Mass. 59. 62. 63. 52 N.E.2d 2. 5 (1943). 
5 Bendett v. Bendett. 315 Mass. at 64. 52 N.E.2d at 6. 
6333 Mass. 265. 269. 130 N.E.2d 575. 577 (1955). See also Shove v. Wiley. 18 Pick. 
558. 563 (1836). 
An illustration of the confusion which may arise upon failure to distinguish be-
tween the use of a memorandum to stimulate recollection on the one hand and as 
past recollection recorded on the other hand may be seen in the following quotation 
from Costello v. Crowell. 133 Mass. 352. 355 (1882): "The remaining exception of 
the plaintiff is to the admission of the entry in the books of Korff & Co. to prove 
the date of the delivery of the blanks by them to Groom & Co .• on one of which the 
note in suit was written. These entries were first used to refresh the memory of the 
witness Armstrong. They were clearly competent for that purpose. It was an 
original entry. made by the witness. which enabled him upon looking at it. to 
testify to the fact. not from actual recollection. but because he knew that he could 
not have made the entry unless the fact had been true. This use of the entry did 
not make it evidence. nor authorize it to be submitted to the jury. unless for the 
purpose of testing the memory which had been refreshed by it. Subsequently the 
defendant offered the book itself in evidence. and it was admitted. and the entry 
read to the jury. We think it was properly admitted. Armstrong testified to the 
delivery of the blanks. but he could not. from recollection. fix the date. which was 
a material fact. For the purpose of doing this. the entry made by the witness at 
the time of the transaction. in the regular course of business. was competent." 
(Citations omitted.) 
8
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if the trial judge finds that it was made "in good faith in the regular 
course of business and before the beginning of the civil proceeding 
... and that it was the regular course of such business to make such 
memorandum or record at the time of such transaction, occurrence or 
event or within a reasonable time thereafter." 7 1£ so qualified, the 
memorandum itself is admissible whether it was made by the witness 
or not, whether it revives his memory or not, and whether he ever 
knew the facts stated therein. 
The statute provides that such a memorandum "shall not be in-
admissible in any civil proceeding as evidence of the facts therein 
stated because it is transcribed or because it is hearsay or self-serving." 8 
(Emphasis supplied.) It is true that the statute also contains a pro-
vision to the effect that the trial court may, in its discretion, "before 
admitting such entry, w.riting or record in evidence . .. require the 
party offering the same to produce and offer in evidence the original 
entry from which the ... facts stated therein were transcribed or 
taken" 9 (emphasis supplied) and to produce the maker thereof or a 
person who has knowledge of the facts stated therein. However, it is 
clear that the net effect of the statute is that the memorandum itself so 
qualified under the statute is admissible in any event, whether it is the 
original entry or not, and introduction of the original is required only 
in the discretion of the court, "to such extent as it deems practicable 
or desirable." 10 
Thus it was held in Saba v. Cohen that the trial court properly 
admitted nine sheets of written records showing items of labor and 
materials allegedly furnished in the construction of a house, where 
the record did not affirmatively show that the court did not make the 
preliminary findings,ll despite the fact that plaintiff testified that "he 
had the originals in court." The Supreme Judicial Court viewed the 
latter statement as "merely showing a readiness to satisfy the provision 
of the statute" as to the discretion in the trial judge to require the 
original "if called upon to do so." The opponent therefore may not 
as of right insist upon the production of the original, nor prevent 
the admission of the entry in the usual course of business, although 
it is admittedly a copy. 
§22.5. Hearsay: Unsupported answer from Registry of Motor Ve-
hicles. In Canney v. Carrier,! plaintiff attempted to prove ownership 




11 Where, although the entry has been admitted in evidence, the record contains 
no express findings by the trial court upon the preliminary facts required under the 
statute, the trial court may be sustained either on a presumption that the requisite 
findings were in fact made by the trial judge, expressly or impliedly, though not 
stated in the record, Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 62, 52 N.E.2d 2, 4 (1943), or 
upon the more fundamental ground that the opponent by having failed to object 
specially to the admission of the entry because of the lack of such findings is held 
to have waived objection on that ground. 
§22.5. 1333 Mass. 382, 130 N.E.2d 879 (1955). 
9
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in the defendant of a car which had struck her in 1949. There was 
evidence of the registration number of the car in question, but by the 
time the trial took place the records of the Registry of Motor Vehicles 
of registrations for 1949 had been destroyed. It was therefore im-
possible for plaintiff to establish registration by summoning in the 
registration itself. 
Plaintiff attempted to prove the registration by offering a letter of 
inquiry as to ownership of the car in question which her attorney had 
written to the Registry in 1949 and which had come back to him 
(apparently by mail) with an intervening date stamped thereon at 
the top, "Registry of Motor Vehicles" stamped at the bottom, and 
with answers to the questions interlined in the letter. The trial judge 
excluded the letter. 
The Supreme Judicial Court overruled plaintiff's exception, stating 
that the answers did not have the support of any witness qualified to 
say that they represented the contents of the original records; that 
they constituted hearsay, and that the letter with the answers was not 
a record the Registrar is required by statute to keep and therefore was 
not a public record. Even if the evidence were taken to establish that 
the letter came back to plaintiff's counsel from the Registry, the Court 
pointed out that this would not overcome the "fatal objections to its 
admissibility." 2 
The Court is clearly on solid ground in its rulings as indicated above. 
However, a slightly different approach by the plaintiff might have re-
sulted in qualifying the letter as evidence. The fatal defect in the 
plaintiff's offer appears to be that first pointed out by the Court, 
namely that the answers were not supported as copies of the original 
records, which it seems could have been accomplished. 
It is well known that certain government agencies and other large 
institutions have lessened their enormous stenographic and filing 
burdens by a systematized practice of employing in routine matters a 
simplified method of handling correspondence such as apparently was 
used in this case. Receipt of the reply by plaintiff's attorney, apart 
from the existence of such a practice, would be highly improbable, and 
existence of the practice in the Registry might properly be inferred 
therefrom. 
However, under present practice in the Commonwealth, it would 
probably be necessary to prove by testimonial evidence what particular 
method of handling such routine correspondence was in use at the 
particular time in the Registry of Motor Vehicles. 
It seems that it should not be too difficult to secure testimony, where 
such was the practice, that such mail would be routed to a clerk whose 
duty it would be to insert answers in accordance with the official rec-
ords. Once the practice was established by such testimony, plaintiff's 
evidence of sending and receiving back the letter, tying the particular 
letter into the system, would constitute circumstantial evidence which 
would give rise to either an inference, or preferably, prima facie 
231111 Mass. at 1184, 130 N.E.2d at 880. 
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evidence, that the letter was answered correctly by a duly authorized 
clerk working in proper course of business with the original records.3 
This would leave plaintiff with a letter which, depending on the 
precise ruling by the court as to the effect of such evidence, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, would either permit or require 
the jury to find the answers in the letter to be a true copy of the 
records. The best evidence rule being satisfied by the obvious im-
possibility of production of the original, the copy in the answers in the 
letter should be admissible.4 The use of the foregoing sequence 
avoids the use of the letters in such a manner as to fall afoul of the 
hearsay rule. 
Plaintiff's further attempt to have an officer of Auto List, Inc., 
state what that publication indicated as to the registration for the 
number failed also, for the dismal reason of a lack of an offer of proof, 
among other things. For a recent case dealing with the admissibility of 
such compilations, see Reddington v. Clayman,5 discussed in Section 
22.6. In the principal case, there does not seem to have been any 
attempt to lay a basis for the finding of the requisite preliminary facts 
by the trial judge. 
§22.6. Hearsay: Necessity of qualifying authority under the medi. 
cal treatise statute. In Reddington v. Clayman,1 an action against 
a physician for malpractice, the plaintiff offered certain medical 
treatises under the Acts of 1949, c. 183, §l, G.L., c. 233, §79C.2 Ex-
clusion was upheld on the ground of lack of evidence to support 
the required preliminary finding that the writer is recognized in his 
profession as an expert on the subject. 
Plaintiff had sought to have the finding made in one instance on 
the basis of biographical statements concerning one of the authors in 
the book itself. This was obviously hearsay, and was held to have 
been properly ignored by the trial judge. 
Plaintiff also had offered the Directory of Medical Specialists and 
the 1946 English edition of "Who's Who" for statements as to the pro-
fessional standing of the authors of the medical treatises, but these 
were also held to be inadmissible as hearsay. 
Judicial notice of the latter books themselves was also ruled out by 
the Supreme Judicial Court. 
These books had not been offered below under G.L., c. 233, §79B,3 
and therefore the Court was not obliged to consider their admissibility 
on that basis. However, the Court indicated that the plaintiff would 
have been met by the same rulings had the books been offered under 
3 See Commonwealth v. Torrealba, 316 Mass. 24, 30, 54 N.E.2d 939, 942 (1944); 
Anderson v. Inhabitants of Billerica, 309 Mass. 516, 518, 36 N.E.2d 393, 394 (1941); 
Meehan v. North Adams Savings Bank, 302 Mass. 357, 363, 19 N .E.2d 299, 302 (1939); 
Prudential Trust Co. v. Hayes, 247 Mass. 311, 142 N.E. 73 (1924). 
4 Smith v. Brown, 151 Mass. 338, 339, 340, 24 N.E. 31. 32 (1890). 
111956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 705, 134 N.E.2d 920. 
§22.6. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 705, 134 N.E.2d 920. 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 707, 134 N.E.2d at 922. 
31956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 708. 134 N.E.2d at 922. 
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that statute. Although the Court conceded that "Such compilations 
conceivably might by their own statements show that they are issued 
to the public for a stated use," it went on to say, "but it would appear 
necessary, at least in the usual case, that there be some independent 
evidence that they are commonly used and relied on to permit such 
a finding to be made." 4 
The Court's rulings to the effect that statements in a publication are 
hearsay if offered to prove the facts stated are clearly correct. How-
ever, the distinction on the basis of which the concession was made 
that such compilations "conceivably might by their own statements 
show that they are issued to the public for a stated use" is not stated in 
the opinion and is not clear. 
This situation is not one in which the fact of the making of the 
statement itself is legally significant, and is used for a non-hearsay 
purpose to establish, for example, an estoppel of the declarant, or the 
making of an offer. It would appear on analysis that the possibility 
envisaged by the Court necessarily involves either use of the statements 
themselves, as evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, or judicial 
notice of the facts stated. 
There is no general acceptance of such an exception to the hearsay 
rule, and judicial recognition or creation of such an exception might 
well be contra-indicated by the general propensity of publishers to 
indulge in self-serving statements in describing their own publications 
and their authors. 
However, there does not appear to be any sound objection to the 
use of judicial notice as to the public character, common usage, and 
reliability of a particular publication, in appropriate instances. It is 
true that an earlier proposed statute,5 which was not enacted, contained 
a provision that the required standing of the authority might be 
established by judicial notice as an alternative to a finding by the 
judge on evidence, and that the statute as finally enacted omitted 
the provision regarding judicial notice.6 However, an argument that 
on this ground the court cannot take judicial notice because the leg-
islature did not prescribe it is entitled to no weight. It would be 
jurisprudential heresy, in the opinion of this writer, to hold that the 
authority for judicial notice by the courts is the permission of the 
legislature. This must be distinguished from a mandate for its exer-
cise, for example, G.L., c. 233, §70.7 There has been no discussion of 
the subject by the Supreme Judicial Court as far as the writer is aware. 
41956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 708, 134 N.E.2d at 923. 
5 House No. 884 (1949). "A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a sub-
ject of history, science or art shall be admissible to prove the truth of a matter stated 
therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies 
that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized 
in his profession or calling as an expert on the subject." (Emphasis supplied.) 
6 Acts of 1949, c. 183, §l. For a detailed account of the legislative background of 
the statute, see Goldman, Malpractice Cases in Massachusetts, 40 Mass. L.Q., No.2, 
pp. 27, 32 et seq. (1955). 
1"The courts shall take judicial notice of the law of the United States or of any 
state, territory or dependency thereof or of a foreign country whenever the same 
shall be material." 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1956 [1956], Art. 26
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1956/iss1/26
222 1956 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §22.6 
The Court itself recognizes that judicial notice is possible in certain 
situations by its qualification in the statement earlier quoted to the 
effect that "at least in the usual case" independent evidence is necessary. 
It is likely that the Court had in mind as instances where independent 
evidence would not be required cases involving dictionaries, almanacs, 
and mortality tables. Judicial notice of the reliability and public 
usage of such publications is often taken, though the cases in Massa-
chusetts are few.s Broadening of this category would appear to be 
highly desirable. 
The chief objection to such expansion of judicial notice in the 
Commonwealth arises from the fact that the Massachusetts decisions 
have limited judicial notice of facts to those of "common knowledge" 
which, by simple logic, even the trial judge must be conclusively 
presumed to know.9 The cases have gone on to hold, by equally simple 
logic, that if the trial judge knows or learns something which is not 
in evidence and which is not of "common knowledge," it must be 
knowledge "private" or "peculiar" to him.lO Such knowledge he is 
forbidden to apply in the trial, without any apparent attempt to dis-
tinguish intelligently between the various types of facts involved. 
It does not follow that because a fact in actuality cannot honestly, 
rationally, or seriously be disputed, it therefore can easily be proved 
by evidence. The case under discussion is an example of a situation 
of common occurrence, where the type of expert evidence required 
may not be readily available to a party. Though it is obvious that 
statistics on the point do not exist, refusal by the trial court to take 
judicial notice in such instances must have led in countless cases to 
results absurd to anyone but a lawyer. 
Broadening the scope of judicial notice as suggested would not 
unduly burden the trial court, for it would be the duty of trial 
counsel to aid the court by furnishing appropriate information as the 
basis therefor, where necessary or desirable. Where information so 
available appeared to be sufficiently reliable, a bald denial by opposing 
counselor a naked demand for proof by evidence, unsupported by in-
formation to the contrary supplied to the court, should not suffice to 
prevent the court from noticing the fact. Should the court in such 
a case err on the objective truth of the matter, it could well be held 
that the opponent had invited the error through his failure to inform 
the court. 
Nor would the proposed extension of judicial notice conflict with 
the philosophy of our adversary system of litigation, at least in its 
modern phase, where the purely fictitious issue has ostensibly been 
abolished. 
It would appear safe to permit the trial judge to exercise his knowl-
edge if he knows, or to be informed by counsel if he does not know, 
8 See. for example. Banks v. Braman. 195 Mass. 97. 80 N.E. 799 (1907). 
9 See. for example. Mady v. Holy Trinity Roman Catholic Polish Church, 225 
Mass. 23. III N.E. 413 (1916). 
10 See. for example. Duarte. Petitioner. 331 Mass. 747. 122 N.E.2d 890 (1954). 
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facts independent of and collateral to the merits of the case which 
are not seriously disputable, even though they are not included in the 
scope of the lowest common denominator of the knowledge of the 
community. 
§22.7. Opinion evidence: Admissibility. The general rule which 
governs the admissibility of the opinion of an expert witness in the 
Commonwealth was well expressed in a recent opinion in which the 
Court said: 
Where a matter may easily be comprehended by jurors the tes-
timony of an expert has no place. . .. On the other hand, if the 
subject is of such character or complexity that it cannot be as-
sumed to be within the ordinary experience or knowledge of men, 
the testimony of an expert is admissible.1 
This apparently simple and clear distinction manages quite regu-
larly to produce a crop of questions on the content of "ordinary ex-
perience or knowledge" to plague the Supreme Judicial Court. This 
year was no exception. It is true that cases seldom arrive at the 
appellate level under steam generated solely by an alleged violation 
of the opinion rule. However, when such questions do come up in-
cidentally, they must be discussed. 
The annoying character of such questions may be illustrated by three 
contemporary legal problems dutifully dredged up by diligence of 
counsel for review by the highest court of the Commonwealth. 
In Jewett v. DOW,2 an action of tort for injuries sustained in diving 
into a swimming pool operated by the defendants, the Supreme Judicial 
Court was asked to review an exception duly taken by the plaintiff to 
an expression of opinion elicited in cross-examination from a witness 
qualified by the plaintiff as an expert in the art of swimming and 
diving. This opinion was stated in answer to the question: 
"In other words, a person, to be careful, should look and see what the 
depth of water is before he dives?" It should come, it is believed, 
as no surprise to anyone that the answer, permitted over objection, 
was: "That's right." The somewhat disconcerting addendum followed 
at once: "But it's almost an impossibility to determine." 
The Court found no error in the foregoing, after pointing out that 
the evidence elicited was cumulative only to previous questions not ex-
cepted to and therefore non-exceptionable, but also, strangely enough, 
hastened to add: "We do not, however, mean to imply that there 
was technical error in the admission of the answer to the question which 
was objected to." 3 
In Supreme Malt Products Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control 
Commission,4 proceedings attacking as unconstitutional the power 
§22.7. 1 Turcotte v. Dewitt, 332 Mass. 160, 165, 124 N.E.2d 241, 245 (1955), briefly 
noted in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.5. 
2333 Mass. 187, 129 N.E.2d 895 (1955). 
3333 Mass. at 190, 129 N.E.2d at 897. 
41956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 483, 133 N.E.2d 775. 
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of the Commission to suspend the licenses of package stores for violating 
the provisions of Acts of 1952, c. 385 and c. 567, §1,1I forbidding sales 
of alcoholic beverages at prices below those fixed in accordance with 
the statute, the plaintiffs offered the opinion of a duly qualified 
psychiatrist to the effect that the retail price of bottled liquor has 
nothing to do with the prevalence of alcoholism or with alcoholism as 
a disease in any individual. 
This opinion the Court held to have been properly excluded, for 
this stated reason: "The part which the price of an article plays in 
its retail sale is a matter of common experience. Indeed, each of 
the sales now before us was effected by the plaintiff or the petitioners 
only after a reduction was made from the established price." 6 
The exclusion appears to have been clearly correct. It could be 
upheld on the ground that as a matter of common knowledge, or at 
least supposition, alcoholism has never appeared, as has gout or 
tuberculosis, to be identified principally with either the rich or the 
poor. However, the reason stated for the exclusion would appear 
to indicate that the Court is of the opposite opinion, namely, that it 
is common experience that a lowering in the price of alcoholic liquor 
would be a factor in the production of alcoholism. In either event, 
the "expert" opinion would be properly excluded. 
In Commonwealth v. Makarewicz,7 a prosecution for murder, the 
Court overruled exceptions of the defendant to questions put to duly 
qualified fingerprint experts for the Commonwealth as to their opinions 
as to "the position the defendant must have been in to place his 
fingerprints on the fenders of the automobiles where they were found." 
This opinion the Court ruled to be warranted because "Matters such 
as these are outside the range of common experience and depend 
upon an extended experience with fingerprinting and the manner in 
which fingerprints are transferred from the finger or hand to a foreign 
object." 8 This ruling also appears to be debatable, at least without 
qualification. 
It would seem that most if not all of these cases might well have 
been dismissed as to the opinion aspect by a statement that the 
decision of the trial court, even if it should be held to be erroneous 
under the refinements of the rule, was not substantially prejudicial. 
Or, to borrow the essence of a current decision,9 the subject should 
perhaps be approached in a less "squeamish" manner, and the entire 
problem of admissibility of opinion testimony where no prejudice is 
shown be dumped into the capacious pit of the sound discretion of 
the trial judge. This would obviate the necessity of the court's 
attempting to discern and draw boundary lines which are at times 
vague and nebulous, and usually arguable. 
II G.L., c. 138, §25C. 
61956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 487. 133 N.E.2d 779. 
7333 Mass. 575. 132 N.E.2d 294 (1956). 
8333 Mass. at 591, 132 N.E.2d at 303. 
9 Fisher v. Swartz, 333 Mass. 265, 130 N.E.2d 575 (1955). 
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